“How Europe Can Stay Economically Strong in an Age of Geopolitical Rivalry”: A Conversation with Arend Jan Boekestijn

January 2026

As geopolitical tensions intensify and economic security moves to the center of political debate, European businesses are confronted with a more volatile and fragmented global environment. Jasper van Schaik, Board Member of ICC Netherlands, speaks with Arend Jan Boekestijn, historian, former Member of Parliament and prominent geopolitical commentator. Known for his sharp analysis of power politics and transatlantic relations, he reflects on how the European Union should prepare itself to safeguard growth and prosperity in an increasingly competitive world.

Geopolitics seems to be reshaping the global economy at an unprecedented pace. How fundamentally has the world changed?

The world has changed far more profoundly than many Europeans realize. We are witnessing a structural shift from a relatively stable, US led liberal order to a world of hard power competition. China has made enormous technological advances. According to an Australian think tank, China now leads in 66 of 74 critical technologies, including artificial intelligence, grid integration, synthetic biology and advanced manufacturing. The United States leads in only a handful, such as quantum computing and geo engineering. There’s no mentioning of Europe.

At the same time, China dominates the processing of critical raw materials, often because it has been willing to accept environmental costs that we in Europe would never tolerate. So the geopolitical contest is not abstract. It is about technological dominance, supply chains and ultimately economic power.

Europe must understand that economic growth today is inseparable from geopolitical positioning. The era in which trade and geopolitics were largely separate domains is over.

China’s strategic ambitions, particularly regarding Taiwan, are often mentioned. How serious is that risk for Europe?

China’s long term strategic objective remains Taiwan. It has invested heavily in military capabilities, including low cost missile systems that are designed specifically to threaten high value US assets such as aircraft carriers. It has expanded its naval capacity and increased shipbuilding tonnage, capacity that would be relevant in a blockade scenario.

Importantly, China has already conducted large scale military exercises simulating encirclement and blockade conditions around Taiwan, at least twice in recent years. These were not symbolic gestures. They were operational rehearsals.

For Europe, the stakes are enormous. Taiwan is central to the global semiconductor supply chain. A blockade would have immediate consequences for European industry. So while this may appear as a regional conflict, its economic impact would be global and immediate.

Can Europe still rely on the United States as its primary security and economic partner?

This is the central question. Over the past year it has become increasingly clear that Europe cannot assume automatic American support under all circumstances. The strategic shift in Washington did not begin with one president. It already started under Obama. Project 2025 and other policy documents make very clear that parts of the American political establishment want to reduce overseas commitments.

That said, we should not underestimate Europe’s leverage. The European Union remains one of the largest trading blocs and consumer markets in the world. When the United States considered aggressive measures regarding Greenland, financial markets reacted sharply. Rising bond yields and falling stock markets had an immediate disciplining effect. Ultimately, no political leader can ignore economic reality. Nobody wins against the economy.

Moreover, even leaders like Trump are aware of the EU’s so called “trade bazooka.” Europe is not irrelevant. It has economic weight. The problem is not lack of power. It is lack of strategic coherence.

Europe still depends heavily on the United States for defense, particularly regarding Ukraine. Where are the vulnerabilities?

The dependence is real.

In Ukraine, European countries have stepped up support and increased production capacity. But key elements still rely on American systems. Patriot air defense systems are a good example. They are essential for intercepting advanced Russian missiles. European countries operate them, but the technological backbone, integration and production capacity remain largely American.

Even more important is what we call Command and Control. That is the integrated system of intelligence, communication, targeting and operational coordination. It is the nervous system of modern warfare. Without American satellite intelligence, data integration and operational planning capacity, European systems function far less effectively.

This means that if Europe wants to become more strategically autonomous, it must invest not only in weapons but in its own defense industrial base, its own command structures and its own technological backbone.

How should Europe think about energy security and economic resilience?

We have replaced Russian pipeline gas with American LNG shipments. That was necessary, but it also creates new dependencies. Europe must think more pragmatically. For example, relations with Qatar present dilemmas, especially concerning human rights. But geopolitics is a world of dilemmas. You must make choices.

At the same time, Europe should accelerate investment in renewable energy. Spain, for instance, has enormous solar potential. Wind energy in the North Sea can be expanded significantly. But this requires solving one key bottleneck: the European grid. Without integrated infrastructure, renewable capacity cannot be fully utilized.

Energy independence is not just about climate policy. It is about economic sovereignty.

Critical raw materials are increasingly described as strategic assets. What should Europe do?

Critical raw materials are indispensable for wind turbines, electric vehicles, defense technologies and advanced electronics. Europe must diversify. That means pragmatic engagement with China where necessary, but also deeper partnerships with countries like Brazil and Australia.

At the same time, we should recognize a hard truth. Economic success is ultimately tied to the rule of law. You can grow quickly without it for a period of time, as China demonstrates. But sustainable economic leadership requires legal certainty, property rights and institutional stability. That remains Europe’s structural advantage.

Internal EU challenges often slow down decision making. What institutional reforms are necessary to safeguard growth?

Europe has three clear priorities.

First, complete the single market. Fragmentation within Europe undermines scale and competitiveness.

Second, consolidate the European defense industry. National duplication is inefficient and costly.

Third, abolish the veto right in key policy areas. As long as a single member state can block strategic decisions, Europe will struggle to act decisively.

Populist movements complicate this process. Some anti European parties resist trade agreements such as Mercosur. Yet in a world of power politics, trade agreements are not ideological luxuries. They are instruments of economic security.

If Europe finds itself squeezed between China and the United States, what is the guiding principle?

Execute the Draghi report.

Europe knows what it must do. Invest in innovation, deepen capital markets, complete the internal market, strengthen industrial capacity. The real challenge is not intellectual. It is political will.

We are entering a world where economics and geopolitics are fused. Europe has the market size, technological base and institutional depth to remain prosperous. But it must act with greater unity, pragmatism and strategic clarity.